Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions by BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
1-2003
Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions
Sushil BIKHCHANDANI
Shurojit CHATTERJI
Singapore Management University, shurojitc@smu.edu.sg
Arunava SEN
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil; CHATTERJI, Shurojit; and SEN, Arunava. Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions. (2003). 1-28.
Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2022
Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions
by
Sushil Bikhchandani,† Shurojit Chatterji,‡ and Arunava Sen∗
September 2004
(First version: June 2003)
Abstract
We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional
types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is non-
decreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we
adopt is dominant strategy in private value models and ex post incentive compat-
ibility in models with interdependent values. NDMU is the following requirement:
if changing one buyer’s type, while keeping everyone else’s types the same, changes
this buyer’s allocation then the new allocation must be relatively more attractive (or
relatively less unattractive) to this buyer.
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1 Introduction
We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional
types. We identify a simple new condition on allocation mechanisms, non-decreasing
in marginal utilities (NDMU), which is necessary and sufficient for incentive compat-
ibility. An allocation mechanism satisfies NDMU if changing one buyer’s type (while
keeping everyone else’s types the same) changes this buyer’s allocation under the
mechanism, then the new allocation must be relatively more attractive (or relatively
less unattractive) to this buyer. In effect, NDMU is a requirement that the allocation
mechanism be sensitive to changes in marginal utilities.
In a private values model, a deterministic allocation mechanism is implementable
in dominant strategies if and only if it is NDMU. This result extends to an interde-
pendent values model which is informationally separable: a deterministic allocation
mechanism is ex post incentive compatible if and only if it is NDMU.
The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt -- dominant strategy in private
values settings and ex post incentive compatibility in the case of interdependent
values -- is equivalent to requiring Bayesian incentive compatibility for all possible
priors (see Ledyard 1978 and Bergemann and Morris 2001). Thus, the assumption
of common knowledge of priors is not necessary for the mechanisms considered here.
This weakening of common knowledge assumptions is in the spirit of the Wilson
doctrine (see Wilson 1987).
Myerson (1981) showed that in a single object auction a random allocation mech-
anism is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if each buyer’s probability of
receiving the object is non-decreasing in his reported type. In extensions of My-
erson’s characterization to models with multi-dimensional types, the necessary and
sufficient condition for Bayesian incentive compatibility is that the random allocation
rule should be the subgradient of a convex function.1 This condition is not easy to
work with. By focusing on deterministic dominant strategy allocation rules, we show
that incentive compatibility is characterized by NDMU, which is much more intuitive
than the subgradient condition. The resulting simplification of the constraint set for
incentive compatible auctions will be helpful in applications such as in finding an
expected revenue maximizing auction in the class of deterministic, dominant strategy
auctions.2
Some of the recent literature on auctions has focused on efficiency. Maskin (1992)
presented a single object model with interdependent values and multi-dimensional
types and showed that any incentive compatible auction is inefficient. Jehiel and
1See, for example, McAfee and McMillan (1988), Williams (1999), Krishna and Perry (1997),
and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001).
2For an analysis of optimal multi-unit auctions of divisible objects see Maskin and Riley (1989).
1
Moldovanu (2001) established that efficiency is generically impossible in auctions
with interdependent values and multi-dimensional types. An important open ques-
tion is the existence and nature of a second-best auction, i.e., an auction which is
efficient subject to the constraints imposed by incentive compatibility. Understanding
the structure of incentive compatible auctions is a first step towards answering this
question.
Even in private value settings, where the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism is ex post efficient, there are reasons to be interested in other (inefficient)
incentive compatible mechanisms. First, as already noted, the auctioneer may be
interested in revenue (rather than efficiency). Second, it is well-known that because
of its computational complexity the VCG auction is infeasible for selling more than
a small number of objects. Several papers investigate computationally feasible (but
inefficient) auctions in private value settings [see Nisan and Ronen 2000, Lehman et
al. 1999, and Holzman and Monderer 2003]. Characterizing the set of incentive com-
patible auctions facilitates the selection of an auction that is preferable to the VCG
auction on grounds of expected revenue or computational feasibility.
Roberts (1979) showed that in quasilinear environments with complete domain a
condition called positive association of differences (PAD) is necessary and sufficient
for dominant strategy incentive compatibility. A multi-unit auction maps into a much
more restrictive domain of preferences than Roberts assumes. The PAD condition is
vacuous in our model as all allocation rules satisfy it.
The paper is organized as follows. The characterization of incentive compatibility
is developed in Section 2 for a single buyer model. In Section 3, we describe how
this characterization extends easily to many buyers. In Section 4, we discuss the
connections of our paper to the subgradient characterization of incentive compatibility
and also to the papers of Roberts (1979) and Chung and Ely (2002). We conclude in
Section 5. Some proofs are given in an Appendix.
2 A single buyer model
There are L indivisible, identical units of an object for sale to a buyer. The buyer’s
type is denoted by a K vector, θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θk, ..., θK). The domain of θ is D ⊆ <K .
We assume quasilinear preferences over (indivisible) objects and (divisible) money.
The buyer’s utility function when his type is θ, he gets ` units, and has m units of
money is:
U(θ, `,m) = V (θ, `) +m.
The buyer has no endowment of the indivisible objects. It is convenient to assume
that the buyer’s initial endowment of money is normalized to zero and that the buyer
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can supply any (negative) quantity required. Also, V (θ, 0) = 0 for all θ. Hence the
utility of no trade for the buyer is U(θ, 0, 0) = 0. Throughout we assume free disposal:
V (θ, `) ≥ V (θ, `− 1) ≥ 0, ∀` = 0, 1, 2, ..., K.
An auction consists of an allocation mechanism h and a payment function t where
h : D → {0, 1, 2, ..., L} is a function from the buyer’s reported type to an allocation
of the indivisible object to the buyer and t : D → < is a function from the buyer’s
reported type to a money payment by the buyer.
The buyer’s type is his private information. By the revelation principle, we restrict
attention to direct mechanisms, where truthful revelation of his type is a best response
for the buyer. Thus, we have the following definition.
An auction is truth-telling if truthfully reporting his type is optimal for the buyer:
V (θ, h(θ))− t(θ) ≥ V (θ, h(θ′))− t(θ′), ∀θ, ∀θ′.
An allocation mechanism h is truthful if there exists a payment function t such that
(h, t) is truth-telling; t is said to implement h. Consider the following restriction on
the allocation mechanism.
An allocation mechanism h is non-decreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU) if for
every θ, θ′, the following holds:
V (θ′, h(θ′))− V (θ′, h(θ)) ≥ V (θ, h(θ′)) − V (θ, h(θ)). (1)
If h satisfies NDMU, then the difference in the buyer’s utility between h(θ′) and h(θ)
at θ′ is greater than or equal to this difference at θ.
NDMU is a simple, intuitive, and new condition on allocation mechanisms. In
effect, it is a requirement that the allocation mechanism be sensitive to changes in
marginal utilities. It is easy to show that NDMU is a necessary condition for truth-
telling:
Lemma 1 If (h, t) is a truth-telling auction then h is NDMU.
Proof: Let (h, t) be a truth-telling auction. Consider two types θ′ and θ of the buyer.
By the optimality of truth-telling at θ and θ′ respectively, we have
V (θ, h(θ))− t(θ) ≥ V (θ, h(θ′))− t(θ′)
and V (θ′, h(θ′))− t(θ′) ≥ V (θ′, h(θ))− t(θ)
These two inequalities imply that
V (θ′, h(θ′))− V (θ′, h(θ)) ≥ t(θ′)− t(θ)
≥ V (θ, h(θ′))− V (θ, h(θ)).
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Hence h satisfies NDMU.
The proof of Lemma 1 does not use the fact that the objects are homogeneous --
h(·) may be an allocation of heterogenous objects to the buyer, or it might represent
a decision that the buyer cares about. Clearly, NDMU is necessary for truth-telling
in more general settings than considered in this paper.
Next, we obtain conditions on D, the domain of the buyer’s type, under which
NDMU is sufficient for truth-telling.
2.1 Sufficiency of NDMU
Without further loss of generality let L, the number of units of the object, equal K,
the dimensionality of the type vector θ. Let
V (θ, k) =
{∑k
`=1 θ`, if k = 1, 2, ..., K,
0, if k = 0.
Thus, θk is the marginal utility for k
th unit of the object for a buyer of type θ.
An auction is truth-telling if
h(θ)∑
`=1
θ` − t(θ) ≥
h(θ′)∑
`=1
θ` − t(θ′), ∀θ, ∀θ′. (2)
Standard arguments imply that if (h, t) is truth-telling then h(θ) = h(θ′) implies
t(θ) = t(θ′). That is, the payment by a buyer depends only on his allocation.
Using (1) we see that an allocation mechanism h is NDMU if for every θ and θ′,
If h(θ′) > h(θ) then
h(θ′)∑
`=h(θ)+1
θ′` ≥
h(θ′)∑
`=h(θ)+1
θ`. (3)
If the buyer is allocated more units by the mechanism when his (reported) type is θ′
than when it is θ, then it must be the case that his valuation at θ′ for these additional
units is at least as large as his valuation at θ.
Suppose that θ = (θ1, ..., θk, θk+1, ..., θK) is such that h(θ) = k. If h is NDMU then
we have the following conclusions:
a. Let θ′ = (θ1, ..., θk−1, θk + , θ′k+1, θ
′
k+2, ..., θ
′
K), where  > 0 and θ
′ ∈ D.
Then h(θ′) ≥ k.
b. Let θ˜ = (θ˜1, ..., θ˜k, θk+1 − , θk+2..., θK), where  > 0 and θ˜ ∈ D. Then h(θ˜) ≤ k.
c. Let θ∗ = (θ1, ..., θk−1, θk + , θk+1 − , θk+2, ..., θK), where  > 0 and θ∗ ∈ D.
Combining a and b we have h(θ∗) = k.
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NDMU is stronger than the requirement that the allocation mechanism be non-
decreasing, i.e., the requirement that h(θ′) ≥ h(θ) for every θ′ and θ such that θ′` > θ`,
∀`. It can be verified that (i) a mechanism that is NDMU is non-decreasing, and (ii)
for K ≥ 2, a non-decreasing mechanism need not be NDMU.
If the domain of the buyer’s types, D, is not large enough then NDMU is not
sufficient for truth-telling. This is clear from the following example with K = 2 units.
Example 1: The buyer’s marginal utilities can take one of three values: θ0 = (55, 15),
θ1 = (60, 25), θ2 = (40, 35). That is, D = {θ0, θ1, θ2}. Consider the allocation rule
h(θ0) = 0, h(θ1) = 1, and h(θ2) = 2. This allocation rule is NDMU on the set D
because: (i) h(θ1) = 1 > 0 = h(θ0), θ11 = 60 > 55 = θ
0
1; (ii) h(θ
2) = 2 > 1 = h(θ1),
θ22 = 35 > 25 = θ
1
2; and (iii) h(θ
2) = 2 > 0 = h(θ0), θ21 + θ
2
2 = 75 > 70 = θ
0
1 + θ
0
2.
We show that there is no payment scheme that will make this allocation mechanism
truthful. Suppose that the buyer payments are tk at θk, k = 0, 1, 2. Without loss
of generality, let t0 = 0. Then we must have t1 ≥ 55, else type θ0 would report θ1.
Similarly, t2− t1 ≥ 25 else type θ1 would report θ2. Therefore, we must have t2 ≥ 80.
But then θ2 would report θ0.
Even if the domain over which the allocation rule is defined is connected, NDMU
is not sufficient for truthfulness. Let Dˆ be the sides of the triangle with corners
θ0, θ1, θ2 defined above. The allocation rule hˆ is as follows: hˆ(θ) = 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ2),
hˆ(θ) = 1, ∀θ ∈ [θ1, θ0), and hˆ(θ) = 2, ∀θ ∈ [θ2, θ1). It may be verified that NDMU is
satisfied but there are no payments that induce truth-telling. 4
Requiring NDMU on a larger domain strengthens this condition. In the rest of
the paper, we make the following assumption on D.
Domain Assumption: There exist constants a¯k ∈ (0,∞), k = 1, 2, ..., K, such that
the domain of buyer types, D, satisfies either (A) or (B) below:
A. D = ΠKk=1[0, a¯k]
B. D is the convex hull of points (a¯1, a¯2, ..., a¯k−1, a¯k, 0, ..., 0), k = 0, 1, ..., K.
The assumption that a¯k < ∞ for all k is not essential, but does simplify the
proofs. Domain assumption A does not restrict the marginal utilities to be decreas-
ing (or increasing). We do not specifically assume that a¯k ≥ a¯k+1, but when this
inequality holds for all k and domain assumption B is satisfied, then we have dimin-
ishing marginal utilities; that is, θk ≥ θk+1 for all θ ∈ D. Under domain assumption B,
θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θK) ∈ D if and only if 0 ≤ θ` ≤ a¯`, ∀` and
θ`
a¯`
≥ θ`+1
a¯`+1
` = 1, 2, ..., K − 1. (4)
A straightforward modification of our proofs extends all our results to the case of
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increasing marginal utilities, i.e., whenD is the convex hull of points (0, 0, ...0, a¯k, a¯k+1, ..., a¯K),
k = 1, ..., K and (0, 0, ..., 0). The assumption of increasing marginal utilities obtains
when the objects are complements, such as airwave spectrum rights.
The inverse of an allocation rule h is:3
Y (k) ≡ {θ ∈ D |h(θ) = k}.
Y (k) is the set of the buyer’s reported types at which he is allocated k units. By
definition, Y (k), k = 0, 1, 2, ..., K are mutually exclusive and their union is D.
The next lemma allows us to assume, without loss of generality, that Y (k) 6= ∅
for all k. DK and DK−S refer to subsets which satisfy the domain assumption in <K
and <K−S respectively.4
Lemma 2 Let hˆ be an allocation rule that is NDMU on DK. Suppose that Yˆ (k) = ∅
for each k = ki, 0 ≤ k1 < k2 < ... < kS ≤ K. There exists an allocation rule h on
DK−S such that Y (q) 6= ∅, ∀q = 0, 1, ..., K − S and:
(i) h is NDMU on DK−S.
(ii) If h is truthfully implementable then hˆ is truthfully implementable.
Essentially, h is obtained from hˆ by bundling a unit ki for which Yˆ (ki) = ∅ with
the next higher unit k for which Yˆ (k) 6= ∅. (From the proof of the above lemma it is
clear that h achieves the same allocation as hˆ for almost all θ.) Thus, if we start with
an NDMU allocation rule hˆ which does not have full range (i.e., Yˆ (k) = ∅ for some
k), by Lemma 2(i) we can map it to another NDMU allocation rule h which has full
range on a smaller commodity space. Then, it is enough to show that NDMU of the
full range h is sufficient for h to be truthful, because Lemma 2(ii) implies that the
original allocation rule hˆ (which is not full range) is truthful. Thus, without any loss
of generality, we consider only full range allocation mechanisms. This simplifies the
proofs.
We sketch a geometric argument for the sufficiency of NDMU for truth-telling.
Restrict attention to K = 2 and assume that D = [0, 1]2 satisfies domain assumption
A. We first establish the structure of the sets Y (k), k = 0, 1, 2. Then, we obtain
payments that will induce the buyer to reveal his private information, θ.
Figure 1a shows three points θ0, θ1, and θ2 such that θk ∈ Y (k), k = 0, 1, 2. First,
consider θ0. Any θ inside trapezoid A to the left of θ0 satisfies θ1 < θ
0
1, θ1+θ2 < θ
0
1+θ
0
2.
Since θ0 ∈ Y (0), NDMU implies that all points in A belong to Y (0). Similarly, all
points in the rectangle B to the right and below θ1 belong to Y (1); and all points in
the trapezoid C above θ2 belong to Y (2). Moreover, any θ in the unit square belongs
3The dependence of Y on the mechanism h is suppressed for notational convenience.
4The proofs of this lemma and of most subsequent results are in an appendix.
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to either Y (0), Y (1), or Y (2); if θ is in Y (0) then to its left is a trapezoid like A
which belongs to Y (0), etc. Thus, applying the above argument to all points in the
unit square we see that the sets Y (0), Y (1), and Y (2) must be as shown in Figure 1b,
with any point on the boundary between Y (k) and Y (k′) belonging to any one of
these two sets.5 Consequently, the sets cl[Y (k)], k = 0, 1, 2, intersect at one point,
c = (c1, c2) and
6
cl[Y (0)] = {θ ∈ [0, 1] | θ1 ≤ c1, θ1 + θ2 ≤ c1 + c2}
cl[Y (1)] = {θ ∈ [0, 1] | θ1 ≥ c1, θ2 ≤ c2}
cl[Y (2)] = {θ ∈ [0, 1] | θ2 ≥ c2, θ1 + θ2 ≥ c1 + c2}.
Let the buyer’s payment when he gets 0 units [i.e., when θ ∈ Y (0)] be 0, when he
gets 1 unit he pays c1, and when he gets 2 units his payment is c1 + c2. It is easily
verified that these payments induce truth-telling by the buyer.
In the remainder of this section, we generalize this argument to more than two
objects. For k = 1, 2, ..., K define7
θmk ≡ sup{ θk | θ ∈ Y (k − 1) },
θMk ≡ inf{ θk | θ ∈ Y (k) }.
A direct consequence of NDMU is that θMk ≥ θmk . Using Figures 1a and 1b, we gave
a heuristic argument for the equalities θmk = θ
M
k , k = 1, 2, and defined ck ≡ θmk = θMk ;
the ck’s provided the money payments that supported h as a truthful mechanism.
That is the basic plan of the proof of sufficiency of NDMU for truth-telling. However,
unless Y (k − 1) and Y (k) have a non-empty interior, θMk = θmk need not be true
without the “tie-breaking” assumption, TBB, defined below. Therefore, we first prove
sufficiency of NDMU and TBB (Lemmas 3 and 4). We then show that for any NDMU
allocation rule h there exists an allocation rule h′ that satisfies NDMU and TBB, and
h and h′ are truthfully implemented by the same money payments (Lemma 5).
Tie-breaking at boundaries (TBB): Let θmk and θ
M
k be defined for an allocation
mechanism h. Then h satisfies TBB if:
(i) θk > 0 for all θ ∈ Y (k), and
(ii) θk < a¯k for all θ ∈ Y (k − 1).
Consider TBB(i). If θMk > 0 then the definition of θ
M
k implies that for all θ ∈ Y (k)
we have θk ≥ θMk > 0. Thus, TBB(i) imposes no restriction. If, instead, θMk = 0
5It is also possible that the boundary between Y (0) and Y (2) meets the left vertical side of the
unit square, rather than the top horizontal side as shown.
6The closure of Y (k) is denoted cl[Y (k)].
7For notational simplicity, the dependence of θmk and θ
M
k on h is suppressed.
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then the definition of θMk implies that there exists a sequence θ
n ∈ Y (k) such that
limn→∞ θnk = 0; the existence of a point θ ∈ Y (k) at which θk = θMk = 0 is precluded
by TBB(i). Similarly, TBB(ii) imposes no restriction if θmk < a¯k, and when θ
m
k = a¯k
it requires that for any θ ∈ Y (k − 1), we have θk < a¯k.
In effect, TBB takes care of the difficulties that arise when Y (k) has an empty
interior for some k, i.e., the point (c1, c2) in Figure 1b lies on the edge of the domain
D. To see this, consider Figure 2, which shows the regions Y (0), Y (1), and Y (2)
for two NDMU allocation rules which differ only along the line segment ABC. In
Figure 2a, Y (1) is the line segment BC and the line segment AB belongs to Y (2);
there are θ ∈ Y (2) along the segment AB for which θ2 = 0 and therefore TBB(i) is not
satisfied. In Figure 2b TBB(i) is satisfied. Observe that θM1 = θ
m
1 in Figure 2b (but
not in Figure 2a). Let c1 ≡ θM1 = θm1 for the allocation rule depicted in Figure 2b. The
payments c1 for 1 unit and c1+0 = c1 for the second unit implement the allocation rule
in Figure 2b and the allocation rule in Figure 2a. Starting with the NDMU allocation
rule in Figure 2a, by transferring AB (or more generally transferring points in Y (2)
for which θ2 = 0) from Y (2) to Y (1) we get the NDMU and TBB allocation rule in
Figure 2b. The prices ck can be defined from the θ
M
k and θ
m
k for the allocation rule in
Figure 2b which satisfies NDMU and TBB, and these prices yield money payments
that truthfully implement the allocation rules in Figures 2b and 2a. This, essentially,
is the intuition underlying the next three lemmas.
Lemma 3 Suppose that h is NDMU and TBB. Then a¯k ≥ θMk = θmk ≥ 0 for all k,
where θMk and θ
m
k are defined w.r.t. h.
For an allocation rule h satisfying NDMU and TBB, define ck ≡ θMk = θmk for
all k. Next, we show that the “prices” ck (yield money payments that) truthfully
implement the allocation rule h.
Lemma 4 Suppose that an allocation mechanism h is NDMU and TBB. Then for
any k = 0, 1, 2, ..., K, we have
k∑
`=1
θ` −
k∑
`=1
c` ≥
q∑
`=1
θ` −
q∑
`=1
c`, ∀q 6= k, ∀θ ∈ Y (k).
Thus, the prices c` truthfully implement the allocation rule h.
The next lemma allows us to weaken the sufficient condition to NDMU.
Lemma 5 If an allocation mechanism h satisfies NDMU then there exists an alloca-
tion mechanism h′ which satisfies NDMU and TBB such that h(θ) = h′(θ), for almost
all θ ∈ D. Moreover, with c′` defined with respect to h′, the money payments
∑k
`=1 c
′
`
truthfully implement h.
This leads to the main result for the single buyer model.
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Theorem 1 An allocation mechanism is truthful if and only if it is non-decreasing
in marginal utilities.
Proof: In view of Lemma 1 we only need to prove that NDMU is sufficient for truth-
fulness. Using the procedure given in the proof of Lemma 5, construct an allocation
rule h′ which is NDMU and TBB. By Lemma 4, we can obtain prices c′` that imple-
ment h′. From Lemma 5 we know that these prices also implement h. Thus, NDMU
is sufficient for truthfulness.
Remark 1: If an allocation mechanism satisfies NDMU on a utility domain D then
it continues to satisfy NDMU if one adds a constant to the marginal utility of the kth
unit. All the results in this section can be proved (with minor changes in the proofs)
if each θk takes values in [ak, a¯k], 0 < ak < a¯k, instead of taking values in [0, a¯k]. This
fact will be important in Section 3.2, where we generalize Theorem 1 to a model with
many buyers and interdependent values.
Remark 2: NDMU implies that for any k, q ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., K}, k < q, there exists
a hyperplane separating the (possibly non-convex) sets Y (k) and Y (q). This is true
regardless of the domain of types D. Take any Ckq which satisfies
sup
θ∈D
{
q∑
`=k+1
θ` | θ ∈ Y (k)} ≤ Ckq ≤ inf
θ∈D
{
q∑
`=k+1
θ` | θ ∈ Y (q)}.
As NDMU implies that the sup on the left is no greater than the inf on the right, it
is possible to choose such a Ckq. The hyperplane
∑q
`=k+1 θ` = Ckq (weakly) separates
Y (k) and Y (q). Any proof of sufficiency of NDMU must show that there exists a point
c = (c1, c2, ...., cK) ∈ <K through which passes a separating hyperplane between every
pair of regions Y (k) and Y (q). In particular, for k < q, the hyperplane
∑q
`=k+1 θ` =
Ckq ≡ ∑q`=k+1 c` separates Y (k) and Y (q).8 The point c represents the prices with
which one can truthfully implement the allocation rule. The proof of Theorem 1
shows that if an allocation rule h satisfies NDMU on domain A or B, then there
exists a price vector (c1, c2, ...., cK) such that h maximizes the buyer’s utility at these
prices.9
After completing this paper, we became aware of Lavi et al. (2003), who indepen-
dently obtain a similar characterization of dominant strategy incentive compatibility
in private value models. There are some differences between Lavi et al.’s paper and
ours: (i) their proofs appear to depend on an assumption that marginal utilities are
8From Example 1 we know that unless NDMU is satisfied on a large enough domain D such a
point may not exist.
9The connection between parametric pricing and incentive compatibility has been noted by Bar-
bera and Jackson (1995), who obtain a fixed-price characterization of dominant strategy allocation
rules in an exchange economy.
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unbounded above; and (ii) they show that NDMU together with full range implies
dominant strategy implementability in multi-object auctions.
3 Extension to multiple buyers
There are b = 1, 2, ..., B buyers. Buyer b’s type is denoted by θb = (θb1, θb2, ..., θbk, ..., θbK),
where each θb ∈ Db ⊂ <K+ . Each Db satisfies the domain assumption of Section 2.1.
The characteristics of all the buyers are denoted by θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θb, ..., θB) or by
(θb, θ−b). Buyer b’s utility function when the types are (θb, θ−b), he gets k units, and
has m units of money is:
Ub(θb, θ−b, k,m) = Vb(θb, θ−b, `) +m.
A feasible allocation f = (f1, f2, ..., fb, ..., fB) is a B vector such that each fb ∈
{0, 1, ..., K} and ∑b fb ≤ K. Let F be the set of feasible allocations. An auction
consists of an allocation mechanism H = (h1, h2, ..., hb, ..., hB) and a transfer function
T = (t1, t2, ..., tb, ..., tB) such that H is a function from the buyers’ reported types to
a feasible allocation and T is a function from the buyers’ reported types to money
payments by the buyers.
An allocation mechanism H is NDMU if for every b, θ−b, θb, θ′b, the following
holds:
Vb(θ
′
b, θ−b, hb(θ
′
b, θ−b)) − Vb(θ′b, θ−b, hb(θb, θ−b)) (5)
≥ Vb(θb, θ−b, hb(θ′b, θ−b)) − Vb(θb, θ−b, hb(θb, θ−b)).
The appropriate generalization of incentive compatibility in the multiple buyer
case depends on whether buyers have private or interdependent values. These two
cases are taken up next.
3.1 Private values
In this case Vb(θb, θ−b, `) = Vb(θb, `) and we assume that
Vb(θb, k) =
{∑k
`=1 θb`, if k = 1, 2, ..., K,
0, if k = 0.
A dominant strategy auction is one in which truth-telling is a dominant strategy
for all buyers. That is,
hb(θb,θ−b)∑
`=1
θb` − tb(θb, θ−b) ≥
hb(θ
′
b,θ−b)∑
`=1
θb` − tb(θ′b, θ−b), ∀θb, ∀θ′b, ∀θ−b, ∀b. (6)
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An allocation mechanism H is NDMU if for every b, θ−b, θb, θ′b, the following
holds:
If hb(θ
′
b, θ−b) > hb(θb, θ−b) then
hb(θ
′
b,θ−b)∑
`=hb(θb,θ−b)+1
θ′b` ≥
hb(θ
′
b,θ−b)∑
`=hb(θb,θ−b)+1
θb`. (7)
Observe that the requirement of dominant strategy in (6) is the same as requiring
truth-telling ( i.e. (2) ) for each buyer b and for each value of θ−b. Moreover (7), the
multi-buyer version of NDMU, is equivalent to requiring (3) for each buyer b and for
each value of θ−b. Fix θ−b, the types of other buyers. Because each Db satisfies the
domain assumption of Section 2.1, all the results of the single buyer model extend to
the multi-buyer case under private values. Thus, the counterpart of Theorem 1 is
Theorem 2 An allocation mechanism is dominant strategy implementable if and only
if it is non-decreasing in marginal utilities.
3.2 Interdependent values
Each buyer’s utility may depend on other buyers’ types. We restrict attention to the
informationally separable case.10 That is, each θbk conveys information (only) about
the marginal utility of consuming a kth unit of the object. This allows us to simplify
Vb(θb, θ−b, k), the reservation value for consuming k units, as follows:
Vb(θb, θ−b, k) =
{∑k
`=1 Vb`(θb`, θ−b `), if k ≥ 1,
0, if k = 0.
where θ−b ` = (θ1`, θ2`, ..., θb−1`, θb+1`, ..., θB`). Buyer b’s marginal valuation for the kth
unit is Vbk(θbk, θ−b k). Free disposal implies that Vbk(θbk, θ−b k) ≥ 0. We assume that
Vbk(θbk, θ−b k) is increasing and continuous in θbk for each b, k.11
The appropriate generalization of truth-telling in this setting is ex post incentive
compatibility. An allocation mechanism is ex post incentive compatible if:
hb(θb,θ−b)∑
`=1
Vb`(θb`, θ−b `)−tb(θb, θ−b) ≥
hb(θ
′
b,θ−b)∑
`=1
Vb`(θb`, θ−b `)−tb(θ′b, θ−b), ∀θb, ∀θ′b, ∀θ−b, ∀b.
(8)
10See Krishna (2000, p. 248) for a heterogeneous object auction model with informationally
separable interdependent values.
11We do not make any assumption about the dependence of Vbk(θbk, θ−b k) on θ−bk. Thus, neither
the single crossing condition nor the assumption that Vbk(θbk, θ−b k) be non-decreasing in θ−bk is
required.
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Ex post incentive compatibility is the same as uniform equilibrium of D’Aspremont
and Gerard-Varet (1979) and uniform incentive compatibility of Holmstrom and My-
erson (1983).
An allocation rule is NDMU if for every b, θ−b, θb, θ′b
If hb(θ
′
b, θ−b) > hb(θb, θ−b) then
hb(θ
′
b,θ−b)∑
`=hb(θb,θ−b)+1
Vb`(θ
′
b`, θ−b `) ≥
hb(θ
′
b,θ−b)∑
`=hb(θb,θ−b)+1
Vb`(θb`, θ−b `).
(9)
As in the private values case, (8) and (9) generalize single buyer versions of truth-
telling and NDMU for each buyer, for each realization of other buyers’ types. It needs
to be checked that the domain assumption, as modified in the Remark 1 following
Theorem 1, is satisfied.
Fix a buyer b and the types of the other buyers, θ−b. Recall that the smallest
and largest values for θbk are 0 and a¯bk respectively. Let V bk(θ−b k) ≡ Vbk(0, θ−b k)
and V bk(θ−b k) ≡ Vbk(a¯bk, θ−b k). As Vbk(θbk, θ−bk) is increasing in θbk, V bk(θ−b k) >
V bk(θ−b k) ≥ 0. The continuity of Vbk(θbk, θ−bk) in θbk implies that as θbk increases
from 0 to a¯bk, buyer b’s marginal utility for the kth unit increases continuously from
V bk(θ−b k) to V bk(θ−b k). Thus, as the domain of θb satisfies the domain assumption, so
does the domain of the marginal utilities of buyer b for a fixed value of θ−b, with the
qualification that the smallest marginal utility for the kth unit may be strictly positive
rather than 0. But under this modified domain assumption NDMU is sufficient to
induce truth-telling (see Remark 1). Thus, we have
Theorem 3 In informationally separable, interdependent values models, an alloca-
tion mechanism is ex post implementable if and only if it is non-decreasing in marginal
utilities.
Whether or not the model is informationally separable, there always exist non-
trivial mechanisms satisfying NDMU. It is the domain assumption on marginal util-
ities that is essential to our proof of sufficiency of NDMU. One set of primitive as-
sumptions under which this domain requirement of Section 2.1 is met is informational
separability. Jehiel et al. (2004) show that in a non-informationally separable, inter-
dependent values model with multi-dimensional types and consumption externalities,
the set of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms consist of trivial (constant) al-
location mechanisms, except in non-generic cases. As there are no consumption ex-
ternalities in our setting, the Jehiel et al. (2004) result does not apply.12 Therefore,
the possibility that the domain assumption on marginal utilities holds (and there-
fore NDMU is sufficient for ex post incentive compatibility) in a non-informationally
separable model with interdependent values remains open.
12See Bikhchandani (2004) for more on this issue.
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4 Relationship to earlier work
We discuss how our paper relates to the literature on auctions with private val-
ues. Myerson (1981) showed that a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive
compatibility of a single object auction is that each buyer’s probability of receiving
the object is non-decreasing in his reported valuation.13 Several authors, including
McAfee and McMillan (1988), Williams (1999), Krishna and Perry (1997), and Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2001), have extended Myerson’s analysis to obtain necessary and
sufficient conditions for Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in the presence
of multi-dimensional types. These results are easily adapted to dominant strategy
mechanisms.
To place our results in the context of this earlier work, consider a probabilis-
tic allocation rule G = (g1, g2, ..., gb, ..., gB) where gb = (gb1, gb2, ..., gbk, ..., gbK) and
gbk(θb, θ−b) is the probability that buyer b gets at least k units when buyer types are
(θb, θ−b).14 An auction (G, T ) induces the following payoff function for buyer b:
Πb(θb, θ−b) ≡ gb(θb, θ−b) · θb − tb(θb, θ−b),
where x · y denotes the dot product of two vectors x and y. Dominant strategy
incentive compatibility implies that for all b, θb, θ
′
b, θ−b,
Πb(θb, θ−b) ≥ gb(θ′b, θ−b) · θb − tb(θ′b, θ−b)
= Πb(θ
′
b, θ−b) + gb(θ
′
b, θ−b) · (θb − θ′b) (10)
=⇒ Πb(θb, θ−b) = max
θ′
b
{gb(θ′b, θ−b) · θb − tb(θ′b, θ−b)}
As Πb(·, θ−b) is the maximum of a family of linear functions it is a convex function of
θb. Further, gb(·, θ−b) is a subgradient of Πb(·, θ−b). This leads to the following charac-
terization for allocation rules. A probabilistic allocation rule is incentive compatible
if and only if it is the subgradient of a convex function.
Our contribution is to show that when one restricts attention to deterministic
allocations rules, the subgradient condition simplifies considerably to NDMU. Thus,
our results lead to a transparent necessary and sufficient condition for dominant
strategy incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions. To verify directly that the
subgradient condition implies NDMU for a deterministic mechanism, define for a
(deterministic) allocation rule H:
gbk(θb, θ−b) ≡
{
1, if hb(θb, θ−b) ≥ k,
0, otherwise.
13Myerson characterized Bayesian incentive compatibility; simple modifications to his proofs yield
a similar characterization for dominant strategy incentive compatibility. For deterministic allocation
mechanisms, this characterization coincides with NDMU specialized to single object settings.
14Feasibility of the allocation rule G implies that 1 ≥ gb1(θ) ≥ gb2(θ) ≥ ... ≥ gbK(θ) ≥ 0, ∀b, ∀θ
and
∑
b
∑
k gbk(θ) ≤ K, ∀θ.
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Next, observe that (10) implies
gb(θ
′
b, θ−b) · (θ′b − θb) ≥ Πb(θ′b, θ−b)− Πb(θb, θ−b) ≥ gb(θb, θ−b) · (θ′b − θb)
which implies
[gb(θ
′
b, θ−b)− gb(θb, θ−b)] · (θ′b − θb) ≥ 0. (11)
Using (7), it is easily verified that a deterministic allocation mechanism H satisfies
NDMU if and only if its associated G function satisfies (11). It is much harder to
establish directly that NDMU implies the subgradient condition.
Although our characterization of incentive compatibility is significantly simpler,
the restriction to deterministic mechanisms may be a limitation. Manelli and Vin-
cent (2003) and Thanassoulis (2004) show that a multi-product monopolist can strictly
increase profits by using a random, rather than deterministic, mechanism. Their ex-
amples involve heterogeneous goods, but it remains possible that a seller of identical
goods may prefer a random selling scheme. Therefore, it is worthwhile investigating
whether our approach generalizes to random mechanisms.
Define NDMU to be (11) for a random allocation rule G = (g1, g2, ..., gB). The
following example establishes that for random allocation rules NDMU is not sufficient
for truth-telling.15 There are two units and one buyer whose valuation θ is in the unit
square. Define g(θ) = 1
3
Aθ, where A is the matrix
[
1 2
0 1
]
. We have
[g(θ′)− g(θ)] · (θ′ − θ) = 1/3[A(θ′ − θ)] · (θ′ − θ) = 1/3(θ′ − θ)TAT (θ′ − θ) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows as A is positive semi-definite. Thus, g is NDMU. But
g cannot be the subgradient of a convex function as the matrix of second partials of
this convex function would then be A, which is not possible as A is not symmetric.
Whether there is an intuitive condition, which in conjunction with NDMU, is sufficient
for incentive compatibility of random allocation rules is an open question.
Roberts (1979) characterizes dominant strategy mechanisms in quasilinear envi-
ronments with a complete domain. He considers a model where the set of alternatives
F is finite and for all f ∈ F , any real number α, and any agent b ∈ B, there exists
a type θb of agent b such that Vb(θb, f) = α. Roberts identifies a condition called
positive association of differences (PAD) which is satisfied by an allocation rule H if
for all θ and θ′
if Vb(θ
′
b, H(θ))− Vb(θ′b, f) > Vb(θb, H(θ))− Vb(θb, f), ∀f 6= H(θ), ∀b,
then H(θ) = H(θ′). (12)
15We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this example.
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An allocation rule H is an affine maximizer if there exist constants γb ≥ 0, with at
least one γb > 0, and a function V0 : F → < such that
H(θ) ∈ argmax
f∈F
(
V0(f) +
B∑
b=1
γbVb(θb, f)
)
.
Roberts (1979) shows that H is a (deterministic) dominant strategy mechanism if
and only if H satisfies PAD if and only if H is an affine maximizer.
What is the relationship between Roberts’ work and ours? The fundamental
difference is that Roberts assumes a complete domain of preferences while we operate
in a restricted domain. In our setting the set of alternatives F is the set of feasible
allocations. In a feasible allocation f = (f1, f2, ..., fB), buyer b’s allocation is fb.
Buyer b is indifferent between two feasible allocations (alternatives) f and f ′ whenever
fb = f
′
b, i.e., there are no externalities in consumption. A further restriction is implied
by free disposal in our model: if fb ≤ f ′b then b weakly prefers f ′ to f .
An immediate consequence of our restricted domain is that PAD becomes vacuous.
It is easy to verify that if there are at least two buyers, PAD is satisfied by all
allocation rules.16 Even in a one buyer model, our Theorem 1 is not a corollary of
Roberts’ characterization. To use Roberts’ theorem, we would have to assume that
(i) the utility of getting k units can either be more or less than k − 1 units and (ii)
the utility of being allocated a bundle k can be any arbitrary number, negative or
positive.17 Even with these assumptions, one would not be able to generalize Roberts’
theorem from a single buyer to a multi-buyer model because we assume there are no
consumption externalities.
Chung and Ely (2002) obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility which
they call pseudo-efficiency. They show that H is dominant strategy implementable if
and only if there exist real-valued functions wb(θ−b, f) such that for each b and θ,
hb(θ) ∈ argmax
f
(
Vb(θb, fb) + wb(θ−b, f)
)
,
and H(θ) = (h1(θ), h2(θ2), ..., hB(θ)) is a feasible allocation. Our NDMU condition
must therefore be equivalent to pseudo-efficiency. However, we believe that NDMU
is, in some ways, a more insightful condition than pseudo-efficiency. For instance, the
definition of the latter involves an existential quantifier which makes it hard to verify.
Pseudo-efficiency is related to the affine maximizer condition of Roberts. In partic-
ular, an affine maximizer is pseudo-efficient but the converse is not true. The domain
restrictions inherent in the auctions model imply that a wider class of allocation rules
16Let f differ from H(θ) in the allocation to exactly one buyer. Then the hypothesis in (12) is
false as the inequality holds for at most one and not for all buyers.
17Complete domain is essential to Roberts’ proofs.
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is incentive compatible. In fact, an affine maximizer h together with the associated
transfer functions
tb(θ) =
{
1
γb
[V0(h(θ)) +
∑
b′ 6=b γb′ Vb′(θb′ , h(θ)) ], if γb > 0,
0, if γb = 0.
is incentive compatible over all quasilinear domains.
Dictatorial social choice functions are incentive compatible on all domains, includ-
ing non-quasilinear environments. Affine maximizers, together with their associated
transfer functions, are incentive compatible over all quasilinear domains. Thus, affine
maximizers can be thought of as the counterpart of dictatorial social choice functions
in quasilinear environments.18
5 Concluding remarks
In the literature on incentive compatibility with multi-dimensional types, charac-
terizations of Bayesian incentive compatibility are far from simple. By restricting
attention to deterministic, dominant strategy mechanisms, we obtain a characteri-
zation of incentive compatibility that is a considerable simplification. The NDMU
condition clarifies the structure of incentive compatible auctions. This in turn will
be of use in identifying revenue-maximizing auctions within the class of deterministic
dominant strategy auctions and shed light on the role of randomization in increasing
revenue for the seller. Further, it may help in establishing the nature and existence
of a second best auction in environments where efficiency is generically impossible,
i.e., when buyers have interdependent valuations and multi-dimensional types.
Observe that NDMU is a monotonicity condition on the difference in a buyer’s
reservation values between truth-telling and lying (see 1). This appears to be dif-
ferent from monotonicity conditions previously shown to be necessary for incentive
compatibility; these conditions are on buyer reservation values itself (see, for instance,
Krishna 2002, pp. 143, 246) rather than on differences in reservation values. The dis-
crepancy is reconciled by the fact that the necessary conditions that appear in the
literature are for single object auctions. In a single object auction, when h(θ′) 6= h(θ),
either h(θ′) = 0 or h(θ) = 0; thus, as the reservation value of not obtaining an object
is zero, (1) reduces to a condition on buyer reservation values. We show that when
there are multiple units the appropriate monotonicity condition is on differences of
reservation values; moreover, this condition is both necessary and sufficient.
Our strategy has been to start with NDMU, a monotonicity condition implied
by dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and show that when applied to a large
18Note that a dictatorial social choice function is also an affine maximizer in the special case where
only the dictator’s γb is non-zero.
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enough domain of buyer types NDMU is also sufficient for incentive compatibility.
In principle, this approach can also be applied to Bayesian incentive compatibility.
However, first the problem of extending this approach to random mechanisms must be
solved (see Section 4). The distinction between random and deterministic allocation
rules is less useful for Bayesian mechanisms since, as a function of his type alone, a
buyer’s allocation is a probability (whether or not the allocation rule as a function of
all buyers’ type is deterministic).
The literature on strategy proof mechanism design suggests strongly that unless
very specific assumptions on the domain of preferences are made, impossibility results
of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type hold. One assumption which, besides being rea-
sonable, has been particularly fruitful in this regard is that of transferable utilities.
Our paper is a first step in a larger project of understanding how further restrictions
on the domain of preferences, restrictions that are suited to the application at hand,
expands the set of incentive compatible allocation functions. A very general theory is
probably unattainable but we plan to extend our analysis to double auctions, possibly
with heterogenous objects.
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6 Appendix: Section 2.1 proofs
Proof of Lemma 2: First, we give a procedure that reduces the dimension of the
commodity space by one, eliminating a kth unit for which Y (k) = ∅. A new rule
h1 is defined on the new commodity space such that if hˆ is NDMU on DK then h1
is NDMU on DK−1, and if h1 is truth-telling then so is hˆ. There are two cases to
consider:
Case I: Yˆ (k) = ∅, k < K, and Y (k + 1) 6= ∅. Map each point θ in DK to a point
γ = (γ1, γ2, ..., γK−1) in DK−1 as follows:
γ`(θ) ≡

θ`, if ` < k,
θk + θk+1, if ` = k,
θ`+1, if ` > k.
Basically, we bundle the kth and (k + 1)st unit together as the new kth unit and
renumber the units accordingly. It may be verified that DK−1 satisfies the do-
main assumption A [B ] if DK satisfies domain assumption A [resp. B]. Define
Φ : {0, 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ..., K} → {0, 1, ..., K − 1} as
Φ(q) ≡
{
q, if q < k,
q − 1, if q > k.
The function Φ is strictly increasing and Φ−1 is well-defined. Define an allocation
rule h1 on DK−1 as follows.19
h1(γ) ≡ Φ
(
min
θ∈DK
{hˆ(θ) | γ(θ) = γ}
)
.
The rule h1 yields the same allocation as hˆ except when there exist θ, θ′ such that
γ(θ) = γ(θ′) and hˆ(θ) 6= hˆ(θ′).20 This occurs on a set of (Lebesgue) measure zero in
DK .
First, we show that NDMU of hˆ implies NDMU of h1. Take any γ, γˆ ∈ DK−1. Let
θ, θˆ ∈ DK be such that γ = γ(θ), γˆ = γ(θˆ) and h1(γ) = Φ(hˆ(θ)), h1(γˆ) = Φ(hˆ(θˆ)).
h1(γ) > h1(γˆ) ⇐⇒ hˆ(θ) > hˆ(θˆ)
=⇒
hˆ(θ)∑
`=hˆ(θˆ)+1
θ` ≥
hˆ(θ)∑
`=hˆ(θˆ)+1
θˆ` =⇒
h1(γ)∑
`=h1(γˆ)+1
γ` ≥
h1(γ)∑
`=h1(γˆ)+1
γˆ`
19The set {hˆ(θ) | θ ∈ DK , γ(θ) = γ} is a singleton for almost all γ; when γ = γ(θ) for some θ in
the boundary between two regions Yˆ (q) and Yˆ (q′), then it is possible that both q and q′ belong to
this set. One can define h1(γ) using any selection from {hˆ(θ) | θ ∈ DK , γ(θ) = γ}; for concreteness,
we define it as the smallest element of this set.
20Thus, θ` = θ′`, ∀` 6= k, k + 1, and θk + θk+1 = θ′k + θ′k+1.
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where we use the following facts: Φ is strictly increasing, hˆ is NDMU, and hˆ(θ), hˆ(θ′) 6=
k, (Y (k) being an empty set). Thus h1 is NDMU on DK−1.
Next, suppose that payments t10, t
1
1, t
1
2, ...., t
1
K−1 truthfully implement h
1. We may
assume that t10 = 0, i.e., if the buyer gets nothing he pays nothing. Thus, t
1
q is the
infimum of
∑q
`=1 γ` among γ ∈ Y 1(q). For ` 6= k, define tˆ` ≡ t1Φ−1(`).21 Using the
mapping from θ to γ(θ), it may be verified that tq is the infimum of
∑q
`=1 θ` among
θ ∈ Yˆ (q). Thus, tˆ1, ..., tˆk−1, tˆk+1, ..., tˆK truthfully implement hˆ.
Case II: Yˆ (K) = ∅. Remove the Kth unit from the commodity space and define
γ`(θ) = θ`, ` = 0, 1, ..., K − 1. Let
h1(γ1, γ2, ..., γK−1) ≡ Φ
(
min
θ∈DK
{hˆ(θ) | γ(θ) = γ}
)
.
The rest of the proof is identical to that of case I.
This procedure is applied successively S times to hˆ and new allocation rules are
created at each stage as follows. Suppose that Y (k) = ∅ for k = ki−1+1, ..., ki−2, ki−1
and Y (ki) 6= ∅. Then, using Case I of the above procedure, new allocation rules with
the requisite properties are successively created by first lumping units ki − 1 and ki
together, then ki− 2 with the bundled unit ki− 1 and ki, etc. Suppose, instead, that
Y (k) = ∅ for k = kS + 1, KS + 2, ..., K. Then, applying Case II, we can successively
remove commodities K, K − 1,..., and kS + 1. This proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3: From the definitions of θMk and θ
m
k , and the fact that θ ∈ D, it
is clear that a¯k ≥ θmk ≥ 0 and a¯k ≥ θMk ≥ 0. Let θk−1 ∈ Y (k−1) and θk ∈ Y (k). Then
(3) implies that θkk ≥ θk−1k . As this is true for any θk−1 ∈ Y (k− 1) and θk ∈ Y (k), we
have θMk ≥ θmk .
To complete the proof, we establish that θMk = θ
m
k . Let θ
k ≡ (a¯1, a¯2, ..., a¯k, 0, ..., 0)
for any k = 0, 1, 2, ..., K (with θ0 ≡ (0, 0, ..., 0) ) Observe that under either domain
assumption, θk ∈ D. Thus, θk ∈ Y (q) for some q. TBB(i) implies that θk 6∈ Y (q) for
any q > k, and TBB(ii) implies that θk 6∈ Y (q) for any q < k. Therefore, θk ∈ Y (k).
Next, let θ(t) = (1−t)θk−1+tθk, where t ∈ [0, 1], be a point on the straight line joining
θk and θk−1, k ≥ 1. Observe that θ(t) = (a¯1, ..., a¯k−1, ta¯k, 0, ..., 0) ∈ D, ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, θ(t) ∈ Y (q) for some q. TBB implies that θ(t) ∈ Y (k − 1) ∪ Y (k). Because
θk(t) = ta¯k increases in t, there exists a t
∗ such that θ(t) ∈ Y (k − 1) for all t ∈ [0, t∗)
and θ(t) ∈ Y (k) for all t ∈ (t∗, 1]. Thus,
t∗a¯k = lim
t↑t∗
θk(t) ≤ θmk ≤ θMk ≤ lim
t↓t∗
θk(t) = t
∗a¯k
Hence, θMk = θ
m
k and we have proved a¯k ≥ θMk = θmk ≥ 0.
21It is not necessary to define tk as Y (k) = ∅.
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The following implication of NDMU is used in the next proof:
If
q∑
`=h(θ)+1
θ′` <
q∑
`=h(θ)+1
θ`, ∀q > h(θ) then h(θ′) ≤ h(θ). (13)
If
h(θ)∑
`=q+1
θ′` >
h(θ)∑
`=q+1
θ`, ∀q < h(θ) then h(θ′) ≥ h(θ). (14)
Observe that if θ′, θ, satisfy the hypotheses in (13) and (14) then h(θ′) = h(θ).
Proof of Lemma 4: First, we prove that for any k = 0, 1, 2, ..., K,
{
θ ∈ D |
k∑
`=q
θ` ≥
k∑
`=q
c`, ∀q ≤ k,
q∑
`=k+1
θ` ≤
q∑
`=k+1
c`, ∀q > k
}
⊆ cl[Y (k)]. (15)
There are two cases to consider.
Case A: (c1, c2, ..., cK) ∈ D.22
Consider the point θˆk() = (c1+1, ..., ck+k, ck+1−k+1, ..., cK−K) where 1, 2, ..., K
satisfy the following conditions:
(i) If [q ≤ k and cq = a¯q] or [q > k and cq = 0] then q = 0.
(ii) If [q ≤ k and cq < a¯q] or [q > k and cq > 0] then q > 0.
As (c1, c2, ..., cK) ∈ D, there exist 1, 2, ..., K satisfying (i) and (ii) above such
that θˆk() ∈ D.23 We claim that θˆk() ∈ Y (k). Consider any q < k. If cq+1 < a¯q+1
then as θˆkq+1() > cq+1, we know that θˆ
k() 6∈ Y (q). If, instead, cq+1 = a¯q+1 then
(as q+1 = 0) we have θˆ
k
q+1() = a¯q+1. Thus, TBB(ii) implies that θˆ
k() 6∈ Y (q).
Next consider any q > k. If cq > 0 then as θˆ
k
q () < cq, we know that θˆ
k() 6∈ Y (q).
If, instead, cq = 0 then (as q = 0) we have θˆ
k
q () = 0. Thus, TBB(i) implies that
θˆk() 6∈ Y (q). But θˆk() ∈ D implies θˆk() ∈ Y (q) for some q. Hence θˆk() ∈ Y (k).
Next, (13) and (14) imply that24
{
θ ∈ D |
k∑
`=q
θ` >
k∑
`=q
(c` + `), ∀q ≤ k,
q∑
`=k+1
θ` <
q∑
`=k+1
(c` − `), ∀q > k
}
⊂ Y (k).
22Lemma 3 implies that if domain assumption A is satisfied then we are in Case A.
23If domain assumption A is satisfied, this is easy to verify. If, instead, domain assumption B is
satisfied then 1, 2, ..., K must be chosen to ensure that θˆk() satisfies (4).
24If for some q ≤ k, c` = a¯` for all ` = q, q + 1, ..., k then the strict inequality in the set on the
left hand side is replaced by a weak inequality. A similar change is made if for some q > k, c` = 0
for all ` = q, q + 1, ..., k. In either case, (i) implies that ` = 0 in the relevant range. This ensures
that the set on the left hand side is non-empty; the inclusion of this set in Y (k) is implied by TBB
together with (13) and (14).
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Further, one can construct a sequence (n1 , 
n
2 , ..., 
n
K) → 0 such that θˆk(n) ∈ D.
Taking limits as n → 0, we get
{
θ ∈ D |
k∑
`=q
θ` >
k∑
`=q
c`, ∀q ≤ k,
q∑
`=k+1
θ` <
q∑
`=k+1
c`, ∀q > k
}
⊂ Y (k),
which in turn implies (15).
Case B: (c1, c2, ..., cK) 6∈ D.25
For each k = 0, 1, 2, ..., K define
Θk() = {θ | ck+k ≤ θk ≤ a¯k, θq = max[θq+1 a¯q
a¯q+1
, cq+q], ∀q < k, θq = min[θq−1 a¯q
a¯q−1
, cq−q], ∀q > k}.
Any θ ∈ Θk() satisfies (4). Thus, provided 1, 2, ..., K satisfy (i) and (ii) defined
in Case A, and are small enough, Θk() ⊂ D [ = ∪Kq=0Y (q) ]. For any θ ∈ Θk(), we
have θq ≥ cq + q for any q ≤ k; thus Θk() ∩ Y (q − 1) = ∅. Similarly, for any q > k,
Θk() ∩ Y (q) = ∅. Thus, Θk() ⊂ Y (k) for small enough `’s . From (13) and (14)
applied to each θ ∈ Θk(), we know that
{
θ ∈ D | θk > ck + k,
k∑
`=q
θ` > ck + k +
k−1∑
`=q
max[θ`+1
a¯`
a¯`+1
, c` + `], ∀q < k,
q∑
`=k+1
θ` <
q∑
`=k+1
min[θ`−1
a¯`
a¯`−1
, c` − `], ∀q > k
}
⊂ Y (k).
Taking limits as (1, 2, ..., K)→ 0, we see that{
θ ∈ D | θk > ck,
k∑
`=q
θ` > ck +
k−1∑
`=q
max[θ`+1
a¯`
a¯`+1
, c`], ∀q < k,
q∑
`=k+1
θ` <
q∑
`=k+1
min[θ`−1
a¯`
a¯`−1
, c`], ∀q > k
}
⊆ Y (k)
and therefore{
θ ∈ D | θk ≥ ck,
k∑
`=q
θ` ≥ ck +
k−1∑
`=q
max[θ`+1
a¯`
a¯`+1
, c`], ∀q < k,
q∑
`=k+1
θ` ≤
q∑
`=k+1
min[θ`−1
a¯`
a¯`−1
, c`], ∀q > k
}
⊆ cl[Y (k)].
That this last set inclusion is equivalent to (15) follows from the observation that (4)
implies that if ck +
∑k−1
`=q max[θ`+1
a¯`
a¯`+1
, c`] >
∑k
`=q θ` ≥
∑k
`=q c` for some q < k or if∑k
`=q+1min[θ`−1
a¯`
a¯`−1
, c`] <
∑k
`=q+1 θ` ≤
∑k
`=q+1 c` for some q > k, then θ 6∈ D. This
establishes (15) for the case when θˆk() 6∈ D for any 1, 2, ..., K .
25Domain assumption B must hold and (4) is violated by (c1, c2, ..., cK).
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Next, suppose that the set inclusion in (15) is strict. In particular, there exists
k, θ ∈ cl[Y (k)] such that ∑k`=q′ θ` < ∑k`=q′ c`, for some q′ < k.26 We assume that
θ ∈ Y (k).27 Let q′ < k be such that ∑k`=q θ` ≥ ∑k`=q c`, ∀q = q′ + 1, ..., k. Therefore,
θq′ < cq′ ≤ a¯q′ and ∑q`=q′ θ` < ∑q`=q′ c`, ∀q = q′, q′ + 1, ..., k. Consider the point
θˆ ≡ (a¯1, a¯2, ..., a¯q′−1, θq′+ˆ, θq′+1, ..., θk, 0, ..., 0) where ˆ > 0 is small enough that θˆ ∈ D
and
∑q
`=q′ θˆ` <
∑q
`=q′ c`, ∀q = q′, q′+1, ..., k. Thus, (15) implies that θˆ ∈ cl[Y (q′−1)].
Suppose that θˆ ∈ Y (q′−1). But this violates (3) as ∑k`=q′ θˆ` > ∑k`=q′ θ` and θ ∈ Y (k).
If, instead, θˆ ∈ cl[Y (q′ − 1)]\Y (q′ − 1) then there exists θ∗ ∈ Y (q′ − 1) which is
arbitrarily close to θˆ and again we get a violation of (3).
Thus, for any θ ∈ cl[Y (k)] we have ∑k`=q θ` ≥ ∑k`=q c`, ∀q ≤ k. A similar proof
establishes that if θ ∈ cl[Y (k)] then ∀q > k, ∑q`=k+1 θ` ≤ ∑q`=k+1 c`. Therefore, the
set inclusion in (15) can be replaced by an equality, i.e.,
cl[Y (k)] =
{
θ ∈ D |
k∑
`=q
θ` ≥
k∑
`=q
c`, ∀q ≤ k, &
q∑
`=k+1
θ` ≤
q∑
`=k+1
c`, ∀q > k
}
. (16)
For any θ ∈ Y (k) and any q < k,
k∑
`=1
θ` −
k∑
`=1
c` ≥
q∑
`=1
θ` −
q∑
`=1
c` (17)
⇐⇒
k∑
`=q+1
θ` ≥
k∑
`=q+1
c`.
The last inequality follows from (16). Thus, (17) is true; when θ ∈ Y (k) the buyer
cannot increase his payoffs by reporting a type θ′ ∈ Y (q), q < k. A similar argument
establishes that (17) is true for q > k. Thus, the payments
t(θ) =
{∑k
`=1 c`, if θ ∈ Y (k), k = 1, 2, ..., K
0, if θ ∈ Y (0).
implement h truthfully.
Proof of Lemma 5: Before describing a procedure which converts h to an h′ with
the stated properties, we need the following result.
Claim: Let h be an allocation rule that is NDMU but not TBB. That is there exists
θk ∈ Y (k) and θk−1 ∈ Y (k − 1)28 such that either θkk = θk−1k = 0 or θkk = θk−1k = a¯k.
Define a new allocation rule which is identical to h except that:
26From the definition of ck we know that q′ 6= k.
27If θ ∈ cl[Y (k)]\Y (k), then there exists θ′ ∈ Y (k), θ′ close to θ, such that ∑k`=q′ θ′` <∑k`=q′ c`.
28Throughout this Claim, Y (·) is defined with respect to the allocation rule h.
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(a) If θkk = θ
k−1
k = 0 then allocate k − 1 (instead of k) units at θk.
(b) If θkk = θ
k−1
k = a¯k then allocate k (instead of k − 1) units at θk−1.
Then, the new allocation rule is NDMU.
Proof: (a) Suppose that θkk = θ
k−1
k = 0. At θ
k the buyer is allocated k − 1 units in
the new allocation rule. Since h is NDMU, all we need to check is that θk satisfies
NDMU inequalities in the new allocation rule. Observe that 0 = θMk = θ
k
k ≤ θk,
∀θ ∈ Y (k). Thus θk satisfies the NDMU inequalities with respect to all θ ∈ Y (k).
Therefore, we need to show that for any θ ∈ Y (q), q 6= k, k − 1,
k−1∑
`=q+1
θk` ≥
k−1∑
`=q+1
θ`, if q < k − 1 and
q∑
`=k
θk` ≤
q∑
`=k
θ`, if q > k. (18)
From NDMU of h we know that for any θ ∈ Y (q), q 6= k, k − 1,
k∑
`=q+1
θk` ≥
k∑
`=q+1
θ`, if q < k − 1 and
q∑
`=k+1
θk` ≤
q∑
`=k+1
θ`, if q > k.
This, together with θkk = 0, implies (18).
(b) The proof is similar.
Consider any h that satisfies NDMU. From h we obtain an allocation rule h′ using
the following procedure. First, let h′(θ) ≡ h(θ), ∀θ, and then make the following
changes to h′:29
1. Let k = K.
2. If θMk = 0 then for all θ ∈ Y (k) such that θk = 0, let h′(θ) = k − 1.
3. Decrease k by 1. If k ≥ 1 then go to step 2; otherwise, go to Step 4.
4. Let k = 1.
5. If θmk = a¯k then for all θ ∈ Y (k − 1) such that θk = a¯k, let h′(θ) = k.
6. Increase k by 1. If k ≤ K then go to step 5; otherwise, stop.
NDMU of h implies that θMk ≥ θmk . Thus, if at Step 2 of the procedure, we
transfer some θ from Y (k) to Y ′(k − 1), then in Step 5 we will not transfer any θ’s
from Y (k−1) to Y ′(k), and vice versa. The Claim assures us that each time we make
changes to h′ in Steps 2 or 5, h′ continues to satisfy NDMU; thus the h′ obtained
at the end of this procedure is NDMU. By construction, the final h′ satisfies TBB.
Further, h(θ) = h′(θ) for almost all θ ∈ D.
29In Steps 2 and 5, θMk , θ
m
k , Y (k), and Y (k − 1) are defined with respect to h.
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By Lemma 4, we know that there exist prices c′` that truthfully implement h
′. We
show that for any θ ∈ D, assuming truthful reporting under either mechanism, the
buyer’s payoffs are the same under h or h′ implemented with prices c′`. Therefore, it
must also be optimal to tell the truth when h is implemented with prices c′`. Let
h(θ) = k and h′(θ) = k′. We establish that
k∑
`=1
(θ` − c′`) =
k′∑
`=1
(θ` − c′`). (19)
If k = k′, then clearly (19) is true. If, instead, k′ < k then, from the above construc-
tion, θ` = c
′
` = 0, ` = k
′ + 1, k′ + 2, ..., k. Similarly, if k′ > k then θ` = c′` = a¯`,
` = k + 1, k + 2, ..., k′. Thus, (19) holds. Therefore, since the prices c′` truthfully
implement h′, they also truthfully implement h.
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